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STATE OF UTAH

HANOVER LIMITED, a partnership;
WESTERN MAINTENANCE AND
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah corporation; and BROOKE GRANT, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, a
Kansas corporation; CESSNA
FINANCE CORPORATION, a Kansas
corporation; TELEDYNE INDUSTRIES,
INC., a California corporation;
AAR NORTHWEST, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and TRANS WEST
AIRCRAFT SALES, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Defendants.
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TRANS-WEST AIRCRAFT SALES, INC.,
Cross Claim Defendant
and Appellant,
to. 860051

vs.
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CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, a
Kansas corporation,
Cross Claim Defendant
and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal' from the Third Judicial Di strict Court
of Salt Lake County, Honorable David B. Dee, Judge

PAUL N. CQTRO-MANES
Suite 280, 311 South State Street
Salt Lake jCity, Utah 84111-2377
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R. L. Knuth
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COURT OF APPEALS
May 2 5 ,

1988

Mr, Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

Hanover Limited, et. al. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.
Court of Appeals No. 880042-CA

Dear Mr. Shea:
Pursuant to Rule 24 (J), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals,
I am handing you herewith the original and five copies of this
letter which sets forth additional citations of authority that
has come to the attention of the Appellant, Trans-West Aircraft
Sales, Inc., after the filing of its brief. The Court of
Appeals has not rendered its decision.
These citations relates
slates to page 32, Point Seven oj
of its brief
and to page 8J-9, Point
Lnt 1 B of the Respondent's brief,
brief.
These citations are Piedmont Equipment Co., Inc v. Eberhard
Mfg, 665 P.2d 256 (Nevada 1983) and the cases cited therein on
on pages 258 through 260; and, INA Insr Co v. Valley Forge Ins.
Co., 722 P.2d 975 ( Ariz. App. 1986) and the cases cited therein
at pages 980 and 981.
These additional citations are given tt> illustrate to the Court
that there is a split of authority on the issue of whether or
not the allegations of the complaint are controlling,as to the
issue of indemnification.
Copy of this letter has been mailed this date to Appellant's
counsel with a hand delivered copy to him at the time of
hearing of this matter on oral argument, this date.
yours,

PAUL N. COTRO-MANES
PNC:pc
cc: H. Wayne Wadsworth, Esq.
R. L. Knuth, Esq.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
HANOVER LIMITED, a partnership;
WESTERN MAINTENANCE AND
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah corporation; and BROOKE GRANT, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, a
Kansas corporation; CESSNA
FINANCE CORPORATION, a Kansas
corporation; TELEDYNE INDUSTRIES,
INC., a California corporation;
AAR NORTHWEST, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and TRANS WEST
AIRCRAFT SALES, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Defendants.
TRANS-WEST AIRCRAFT SALES, INC.,
Cross Claim Defendant
and Appellant,
-. 860051

vs,
CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, a
Kansas corporation,
Cross Claim Defendant
and Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTER ON APPEAL
I
Is a retailer entitled to be indemnified for
damages suffered by it when it is named|in a product liability
action, which damages include its attorney's fees and costs,
from the manufacturer of the claimed defective product.

Did the Trial Court err in not trying the issue of
whether or not the aircraft was defective, and whether or
not Trans-West was a passive tortfeasor as opposed to an
active tortfeasor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action based on a cross claim of the
Defendant-Appellant, Trans-West Aircraft Sales, Inc., (TransWest) a Utah corporation, against the Defendant-Respondent,
Cessna Aircraft Company, (Cessna) a Kansas corporation,
seeking indemnification for damages suffered by Trans-West
in defending itself in the product liability action brought
by the plaintiffs claiming that an aircraft designed and
manufactured by Cessna was defective.
The complaint and all cross claims were compromised
and settled, except for the cross claim of Trans-West Aircraft
Sales against Cessna Aircraft Company and Cessna Finance
Company.
From cross motions for summary judgment, TransWest appeals from summary judgment in favor of Cessna of no
cause of action and from the order denying its motion for
summary judgment in its favor and from the order striking
the trial of the matter as to whether or not the aircraft
was in fact defective and Trans-West was not an active
tortfeasor.
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The following facts are uncontroverted:
1.

Defendant, cross-claimant I appellant, Trans-

West Aircraft Sales, Inc., (Trans-West) is a Utah corporation
with its principal place of business at the Salt Lake City
International Airport.

(Complaint, R-oi, Para. 6; Answer of

Trans-West, R-118; Affidavit, Battochiol R-272)
2.

Defendant, cross-defendant, respondent, Cessna

Aircraft Company, (Cessna) is a Kansas-based aircraft manufacturer
engaged in the designing, manufacturing, equipping and
marketing of light aircraft which it markets through what
the plaintiffs denominate as the Cessna System.
Answers to Interrogatories, R-914, No. \5;

(Cessna's

Complaint, R-02,

Para. 2, R-03, Para. 7? and Answer of Tijrans-West, R-118)
3.

Cessna markets its aircraft through a system

of franchised aircraft retail dealers who acquire their
aircraft from Cessna franchised zone distributors, or wholly
owned zone distributors. (R-94)
4.

Trans-West, at the time of the sale of the

1979 Cessna Aircraft P-210, the subject matter of the product
liability suit, was a franchised Cessna Aircraft retail
dealer.

(Complaint, R-04, Para. 13; An$wer of Trans-West,

R-118, R-908)
5.

Trans-West, in selling Cessna aircraft to the

public, purchased all Cessna airplanes ifrom the regional
franchised zone distributor, the defendant, AAR Northwest

-3-

Inc. (AAR) , not a party to this appeal, who in turn purchased
the aircraft from Cessna directly.
October 15, 1982.
6.

(Affidavit, Jeno Battochio,

(R-273,274; R-04, Para. 17)

The aircraft in question was acquired by AAR

from Cessna in March 197 9, which used it as a demonstrator.
The plane is described as a pressurized single engine, high
wing, six passenger aircraft, Cessna, Model P-210.

This

aircraft was sold by AAR to Trans-West, who in turn acted as
a conduit for the sale of the aircraft to the plaintiffs,
Hanover Limited (Hanover), and Western Maintenance and
Management Inc., a Utah corporation.

This sale from AAR to

Trans-West to Hanover was a back-to-back transaction, which
was consummated all on one day, April 18, 1979.

(Complaint,

R-04, Para. 14, 17; Reply of Cessna to Cross-claim, R-1233;
Affidavit, Battochio, R-274)
7.

The aircraft was not modified, changed, repaired,

or otherwise worked on by the defendant, Trans-West, from
the time of its sale by AAR to Trans-West and its sale and
delivery on the same day by Trans-West to the plaintiffs.
(Depo, Battochio, July 12, 1985, p. 7, R-1417, et. seq.)
8.

Trans-West denied having made any representations

as to the merchantable quality of the aircraft to the plaintiffs
or any statement whatsoever about P-210 aircraft, except
those representations contained in Cessna prepared advertising
materials.

This was admitted by the plaintiff, Brooke
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Grant, who was the principal executive bfficer of Hanover,
who in his deposition stated that TransFWest made no other
representations about the aircraft other than what the
Cessna sales brochures stated.
86, 87, Addendum)

(R-1304J ; Depo, Grant, pp.

This admission was ih direct controvention

to the allegations of the complaint.

Farther, Cessna admitted

that Trans-West made no express warrantees other than those
contained within Cessna's advertising materials.
9.

(R-1303)

The plaintiff, Brooke Grant, testified with

respect to the representations of Transf-West' s president,
Mr. Battochio, prior to the sale of the aircraft:
"Q.

Over and above the information contained in
that brochure or those brochures, did he tell
you anything additional that was in those
brochures about the performance of the
aircraft?

"A.

I don't think so. You m$an did he make any
recommendations outside pf what Cessna was
representing? I don't remember. I
don't remember that he djld."
(Depo, Grant, p. 86, Addendum)

10.

Trans-West did not maintain at any time

germane to the sale of this aircraft:
(a)

an aircraft repair facility,

(b)

an aircraft maintenance facility,

(c)

an aircraft manufacturing facility,

(d)

a test facility of &ny kind;

and Cessna knew this to be a fact prior to the commencement
of plaintiffs' action and at all times cjluring the prosecution
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of the same,

(Depo, Battochio, July 12, 1985, p. 10, R-1417,

et. seq.)
11.

Trans-West only maintained and operated a

retail sales agency for the sale of aircraft and in particular,
new and used Cessna aircraft, and Cessna knew this prior to
the commencement of plaintiffs1 action and at all times
during the prosecution of the same.

(Depo, Battochio, p.

10, R-1417, et. seq.)
12.

Trans-West did not formulate, write, print,

produce, or otherwise generate sales manuals, advertisements,
news releases and pilot's operating data, but utilized the
material advertising Cessna aircraft supplied it by Cessna
and Cessna Finance Company, not a party to this appeal, and
Cessna knew this prior to the commencement of plaintiffs1
action and at all times during the prosecution of the same.
(Cessna Finance Answers to Interrogatories dated October 6,
1983, Nos. 6, 7, R-714; R-912-914)
13.

Trans-West did not design, manufacture,

assemble, inspect or test Cessna Aircraft and in particular,
the P-210, or any component thereof, and Cessna knew this
prior to the commencement of plaintiffs' action and at all
times during the prosecution of the same.
14.

(R-916-917)

Trans-West had no duty to nor did it publish,

discriminate, distribute or mail to its customers airworthiness

-6-

directives or emergency airworthiness directives, and Cessna
knew this prior to the commencement of plaintiffs1 action
and at all times during the prosecution of the same.
15.

(R-927)

Trans-West made no express warranties of the

P-210 aircraft but did give the plaintiffs a copy of the
standard Cessna printed warranty.

(Depo, Battochio, p. 22,

R-1417, et.. seg. ; Depo, Grant, p. 86, Addendum)
16.

The plaintiffs or the otjier defendants failed

to prove that Trans-West did anything m0re than merely act
as the selling conduit of the aircraft in question or sold
the aircraft in a negligent manner.
17.

AAR Northwest, Inc., was the point of contact

and communication between Cessna and appointed retail dealerships, including Trans-West, as the zont distributor, at the
time of the purchase of the P-210 by the plaintiffs, and any
communication involving Cessna by Transj-West was made directly
with AAR and not with Cessna.

However, when the action was

filed, Cessna had substituted a company owned zone distributor
for AAR.

(Affidavit, Jeno Battochio, October 15, 1982, R-273)
18.

Immediately following th^ service of summons

and complaint in this matter, Trans-West's president, Jeno
Battochio, called the Cessna zone manager, Bob Conover, then
manager of the wholly owned Cessna Zone distributorship at
Troutdale, Oregon, and advised him that Trans-West was being
sued over the P-210 and asked him if Cessna would defend
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Trans-West on the suit.

(Depo, Battochio, p. 13, R-1417f

et. seq.)
19.

Cessna through the zone manager declined to

assume the defense of Trans-West and at no time thereafter
did Cessna undertake the defense of this action for TransWest.

(Depo, Battochio, p. 14, R-1417, et.. seq.)
20.

Cessna's zone manager was not aware of any of

the allegations of the complaint when he declined to defend
Trans-West on this suit.

(Depo, Battochio, pp. 14, 20, R-

1417, et.. seq. )
21.

After months of protracted pre-trial discovery,

the plaintiffs and the defendant Cessna entered into settlement
negotiations, but at no time did Trans-West either participate
or join in the negotiations.
settled.

The matter was ultimately

However, under the settlement agreement, Trans-

West did not pay any part of the agreed settlement figure
and refused to dismiss its cross-claims against Cessna and
Cessna Finance Company for indemnification of its costs and
expenses incurred in defending the action, which included
its attorney's fees.

(Stipulation of Dismissal, R-1246-

1248)
22.

Trans-West, in addition to court costs,

deposition costs and pre-trial discovery expenses, in the
amount of $118.00, incurred attorney's fees in the sum of
$6,910.00 or a total of $7,028.00.
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(R-1359, 1362-1365)

23.

Trans-West asserts that its costs, expenses

and attorney's fees are damages which itj incurred and is now
looking for indemnification from Cessna for those expenses
and costs.
24.

The matter was set down ijor trial on the

issue of whether or not the subject airdraft was in fact
defective and whether or not the financing of the aircraft
by Cessna Finance was tortious as asserted by the plaintiff,
and whether Trans-West did in fact act in such a way that
would be construed to be an active participant in the negligence
complained of by the plaintiff.

(R-1324)

This trial date

was stricken upon the granting of the summary judgment in
favor of Cessna and Cessna Finance, thereby precluding
Trans-West from adjudicating the issue of liability of
either Trans-West or Cessna under plaintiff's complaint.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT^
1.

A retail seller is entitled to indemnification

from a manufacturer in a product liability action.
2.

A retail seller does not have to make a written

tender of defense to the manufacturer t<& activate the duty
of indemnification.
3.

A retail seller may predicate the right to

indemnification on the theory of implied contract between
the retail seller and the manufacturer.
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4.

In the case before the Court the right of

indemnification exists regardless of the legal theory used.
5.

Legal fees and costs are a part of the damages

that the retail seller is entitled to against the manufacturer
in obtaining indemnification.
6.

A claim of indemnification may be asserted by

cross claim or third party complaint.
7.

Under the facts of this case the manufacturer

knew that the retail seller was a passive party and, therefore,
entitled to indemnification and defense.
8.

A retail seller who does nothing more than

sell a product without alteration, repair or other involvement
or negligence is a passive party.
9.

The Court erred in not allowing a trial on the

issue that the aircraft in question was defective.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DEFENDANT, TRANS-WEST, IS ENTITLED TO
INDEMNIFICATION FROM THE DEFENDANT,
CESSNA AIRCRAFT.
The general law with respect to sales and in
particular implied warranties of merchantable quality or
fitness for intended purposes holds that the ultimate seller
of the product has the right of indemnification back over
against the distributors, wholesalers, and manufacturers,
from whom he obtained the product for sale to the ultimate
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consumer, 41 Am Jur 2d 717, Indemnity § 25.

This includes

the award of attorney's fees as part of the damages comprising
the indemnification award, Massingale v^ Northwest Cortez,
Inc., 620 P.2d 1009 (Wash. App., 1980), so long as the
ultimate seller stands in the position of being either
passive or merely a conduit in the sale of the product to
the ultimate consumer where that seller\ has not modified,
altered, changed, or otherwise dealt wi-j:h the product in a
negligent manner.
The Oregon Appellate Court injDavidson v. Parker,
622 P.2d 1113, 1118 (Ore. App., 1981) observed:
"Where a retailer delivers goods to a
buyer without creating a defeat in the
product, it is only secondarily liable
for that defect and is entitled to
indemnity from the manufacturer."
Utah recognizes this law.
Company, 404 P.2d 248 (Utah, 1965).

Saijione v. J. C. Penney
In this case, a department

store's right to maintain its third-par^y complaint against
an escalator manufacturer where a child!was injured on the
escalator was affirmed by the Supreme C6urt.
Every person must act or use that which he controls
so as not to injure another.

If his actions do injure

another, then a third person who is called upon, under some
theory of law, to respond to those damages may look to that
person who is primarily liable for the recovery of any
damages awarded against that third perspn.
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Holmstead v.

Abbott G. M. Diesel, Inc., 493 P.2d 625 (Utah, 1965).

See

also Hartwig Farms v. Pacific Gamble Robinson, 625 P.2d 171
(Wash., 1981).
In products liability cases, the manufacturer has
an implied duty to defend the retailer, and the manufacturer
is liable to the retailer for attorney's fees if it fails to
defend.

Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, 604 P.2d

1059 (Alaska, 1983).
In D. G. Shelter Products v. Moduline Industries,
684 P.2d 839 (Alaska, 1984), the court in footnote 8 observed:
"The 'general rule1 was stated in Heritage
v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d
1059, 1067 (Alaska 1979), quoting Addy v. Bolton,
257 S.C. 28, 183 S.E.2d 708, 710 (1971):
ff

[I]n actions of indemnity, brought where
the duty to indemnify is either implied
by law or arises under contract, and no
personal fault of the indemnitee has
joined in causing the injury^ reasonable
attorney's fees incurred in resisting the
claim indemnified against may be recovered
as part of the damages and expenses.
(Emphasis added)"
Clearly, Trans-West had the right to maintain its
cross-claim for indemnification against Cessna.
POINT TWO
WRITTEN TENDER IS NOT REQUIRED TO
ACTIVATE THE DUTY OF INDEMNIFICATION.
Cessna asserted that a written tender of defense
must have been given to it by Trans-West before Cessna had
any duty to defend or answer in indemnification.
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It is a fact which is not in djispute that such a
written tender was not made by Trans-Wes|t.
It is a fact, however, that Cessna was a party
defendant with Trans-West in this actionj and, therefore, had
actual notice of the pendency of the act|ion.
It is a further fact that Tran|s-West gave oral
notice of the pendency of the action to (Cessna's zone manager
immediately after the commencement of tl^e action and requested
that Cessna defend Trans-West, which request was summarily
denied.
Case law points out that a tehder is not a prerequisite to fix liability under indemnification.
New York Oil Co. , 243 P. 118 (Wyo, 1926)|

Miller v.

This doctrine was

reaffirmed in Pan American Petroleum v. Maddox Well Service,
586 P.2d 1120 (Wyo, 1979).
The Alaska Supreme Court in D. G. Shelter Products
v. Moduline Industries, 684 P.2d 839 (Alaska, 1984), after
pointing out that proper notice of the litigation should be
given so that the indemnitor could prepare a defense, then
said:
"A tender of defense by the indemnitee,
however, is not required since it can be
inferred upon timely notice of the pending
action. Bedal v. Hallack & Howard Lumber
Co. , 226 F.2d 526, 535-36 (9th Cir, 1955)."
The same holding was affirmed in Hales v. Green
Colonial, Inc., 402 F. Supp 738 (Mo., 1975); Ward v. City
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National Bank & Trust Co,, 379 S.W.2d 614 (Mo., 1964), and
the numerous cases cited therein.
Many cases have gone even further in holding that
notice, as opposed to tender, is not even required unless
the indemnitee seeks to bind the indemnitor to the original
judgment or determination of liability.

McStain Corp. v.

Elfine Plumbing & Heating Inc., 558 P.2d 588 (Colo. App.,
1976) ; Insurance Company of North America v. Hawkins, 246
N.W.2d 878 (Neb., 1976); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.
Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 38 N.W. 360 (N.Y., 1895);
Hill v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son Inc., 268 S.E.2d 296 (W. V a . ) .
In 42 CJS Indemnity § 32a(2) (1944), it is stated:
"The omission to give notice to the indemnitor,
however, does not affect the right of action
against him, but simply changes the burden of
proof and imposes on the indemnitee the necessity
of again litigating and establishing all of the
actionable facts."
Cited with approval in Illinois Central Railroad v. Blaha,
89 N.W.2d 197, 201-02 (Wis., 1958).

The same rationale was

applied in Jennings v. United States, 374 F.2d 983 (4th
Cir., 1967), wherein the court observed:
"The concept that notice plus an opportunity
to defend render binding on an indemnitor the
judgment in a case in which he did not participate springs from notions of res judicata."
In the case now before the Court, Cessna not only had notice,
but was a party defendant and in effect controlled the
conduct of the case and then settled the action without the
participation of Trans-West in the settlement negotiations.
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It is respectfully

submitted that the law is clear

that no tender of defense is required to maintain an action
of indemnification, nor for that matter is notice, but as in
the instant case actual notice was giveiji both by the institution
of the action against Cessna, Trans-We si and others and the
notice and demand for defense made by Tran s-West of Cessna,
it had ample opportunity to participate in the defense,
The argument that Trans-West cfcannot maintain its
action for indemnification is without mer it.
POINT THREE
THE RIGHT TO INDEMNIFICATION MAY BE
PREDICATED UPON AN IMPLIED CONTRACT
THEORY•
The question has been raised many times in the
field of indemnification as to whether ^he right of action
is founded on contract or tort.

Genera

Electric Co. v.

Cuban American Nickel Co., 396 F.2d 89 (5th Cir., 1968).
The two types of indemnity rest on sepafate and distinct
theoretical bases and require proof and evaluation of different
elements.

Parfait v. Jahncke Service, Inc.,

484 F.2d 296

(5th Cir., 1973).
In the case now before the Coilirt,, Cessna, as a
manufacturer, designed, built and manu f^ctured an aircraft
and sold the same to its distributor wh<£> in turn sold it to
Trans-West, the ultimate seller.

Thus, the aircraft was

sold to Trans-West with the same implied warranty of merchant-
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ability as that which ran with this sale to the ultimate
purchaser and user.
The implied warranty of merchantability creates an
implied contract in law. Whittle v. Timesavers, Inc., 572
F. Supp 584 (Va., 1983); Paradis v. A.L. Nichols, 12 N.E.2d
863 (Mass., 1938).

And this implied contract in law creates

an implied indemnity.
In the case of Morningstar v. Black & Decker
Manufacturing Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va., 1979), the West
Virginia court acknowledged the right of implied indemnity
and stated:
"Most Courts recognize that a seller who
does not contribute to the defect may
have an implied indemnity remedy against
the manufacturer, when the seller is sued
by the user."
Thus, the Court may predicate the right of indemnification upon an implied contract between Cessna as the
manufacturer of a product, and Trans-West as the intermediate
purchaser who bought the product with the same warranties as
were ultimately provided the end buyer-user (the plaintiffs
in this suit).

The right of indemnification, however, does

not hinge on this theory only, but can and in many jurisdictions
does predicate itself on negligence or express contract
theories.
It would seem that this is a situation of first
impression before the courts of Utah.
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POINT FOUR
TRANS-WEST'S RIGHT TO INDEMNIFICATION
EXISTS REGARDLESS OF THE THEORY USED.
As pointed out in the various cases cited herein,
the right of indemnification exists whether one wishes to
espouse the theory of active-passive negligence as between a
manufacturer and a seller who sells without modification or
change, or an express contract or an implied contract arising
from the express and/or implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability.
Based upon either of these theories, the law of
Utah not being clear as to which one applies, Trans-West is
still entitled to indemnification, whiclj doctrine Utah does
recognize.
In Holmstead v. Abbott G. M. iiiesel, Inc., 493
P.2d 625 (Utah, 1972), the Utah court recognized and cited
with approval § 96 of the Restatement off the Law of Restitution,
which states:
"A person who, without personal fault,
has become subject to tort liability
for the unauthorized and wrongful
conduct of another, is entitled to
indemnity from the other for expenditures properly made in the discharge
of such liability."
The Supreme Court went on to state that:!
"Subrogation is said to be a creation
of equity for the purpose of effecting
an adjustment between parties so as to
secure ultimately the payment or discharge
of a debt by a person who in good conscience
ought to pay for it."
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Applying this philosophy of having the party who
in good conscience pay for the wrongdoing in the instant
case, it is clear that it is Cessna, the party who was the
active participant in the manufacture of a bad product, who
should be called upon to pay the costs and expenses incurred
by Trans-West in defending itself from the wrongs of Cessna,
as it stands as a mere conduit in the stream of commerce, a
passive participant who had the misfortune to be named as a
party defendant along with an active negligent party or a
party who actively breached its duties of warranty.
POINT FIVE
TRANS-WEST IS ENTITLED TO THE AWARD
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AS A PART OF ITS
DAMAGES.
Trans-West asserts that as it is entitled to
indemnification, whether it be by implied contract, express
contract, or under a tort negligence theory and that the
right of such indemnification is affirmed as the general law
throughout the United States.

Hill v. Joseph T. Ryerson &

Son, 268 S.E.2d 296 (W. V a . ) , and the extensive cases cited
therein.
As a part of the damages incurred by Trans-West,
it asserts that it is entitled to the reimbursement of the
attorney's fees and costs that it paid out in defense of
this action.
Cessna, on the other hand, points out that there
is no basis for the award of attorney's fees as under Utah

-18-

law, there is no written contract nor stjatute authorizing
the award of attorney's fees in this type of case.
Cessna misses the point asserted by Trans-West,
that is, that attorney's fees are a part of the damages
awardable under an indemnification theor|y, and not a separate
award of fees distinct from damages.
The cases throughout the Unitdd States have almost
uniformly allowed attorneys fees as a part of the indemnification to which a seller is entitled frcjm a manufacturer
where the manufacturer has been the actijve participant in
the creation of a defective product and the seller is a
passive participant in the transaction, who has not added by
alteration, repair or otherwise to the failure of the product
sold.
The payment of attorney's fee3 is recognized as a
part of indemnification under § 80, Restatement of the Law
of Restitution, and the cases cited thereunder.

Kentucky

recognized this principle in 1972 in Chifttom v. Abell, 485
S.W.3d 231, 237 (Ky. , 1972) (reversed or} other grounds) in
holding that where there was a failure to discharge a duty
to provide a defense on a claim for damages, the indemnitee
would be entitled to the award of attorney's fees paid for a
defense of the action.
This same theory was adopted tiy Florida in 1979 in
Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stevenson,) 370 S.2d 1211,
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1214, (Fla., 1979) (reversed on other grounds) wherein the
court noted that a principal is subject to a duty to exonerate
an agent for the expense of defending actions brought by
third parties which are unfounded but not brought in bad
faith.

In an earlier case, Insurance Co. of North America

v. King, 340 So.2d 1175 (Fla. App., 1976), the court observed:
" . . . Generally an indemnitee is entitled
to recover, as part of his damages, reasonable
attorneys fees, and reasonable and proper legal
costs and expenses, which he is compelled to
pay as the result of suits by or against him
in reference to the matter against which he is
indemnified."
This case goes on to point out that the allegations
of wrongdoing in the plaintiffs1 complaint are not sufficient
to allow the wrongdoing party to escape liability by setting
up the defense of the allegations of the complaint as Cessna
attempts to do in this case.

The court stated:

"A plaintiff should not be able to
arbitrarily deprive a defendant of his
right to indemnification from a third
party by alleging that he was actively
negligent when in fact that defendant
is found not to have been actively
negligent."
In a case on all fours factually with the present
case, the Texas Appellate Court in Champion Mobile Homes v.
Rasmussen, 553 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App., 1977) , in relying
on § 93 of the Restatement of the Law of Restitution, observed
that the Restatement provides that where a person (such as
the manufacturer) has supplied to another (such as the
retailer) a chattel which, because of the supplier's negligence
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or other fault, is dangerously defective for the use for
which it is supplied, and both the supplier and the second
party have become liable in tort to a tiriird person injured
by such use, the supplier (manufacturer)J is under a duty to
indemnify the second party (retailer) f<br expenditures made
in discharge of the third person's claim.
Section 93 of the Restatement! of the Law of
Restitution states:
"(1) Where a person has supplied to another
a chattel which because of th£ supplier's
negligence or other fault is dangerously
defective for the use for which it is supplied
and both have become liable in tort to a third
person injured by such use, the supplier is under
a duty to indemnify the other!for expenditures
properly made in discharge of I the claim of the
third person, if the other used or disposed
of the chattel in reliance upon the supplier's
care and if, as between the two, such reliance
was justified."
The significant words to be noted in the Champion
case and § 93 of the Restatement is "expenditures properly
made" (emphasis mine).
Is it not true, attorney's fe^s tall within the
definition of an expenditure?
Is it not the intent of indemnification to shift
over to the defaulting or wrongdoing pafty the cost and
expense incurred by the innocent party?
How can this equitable principle be carried out if
the costs and expenses (which include attorney's fees) are
not paid?
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It is to be noted that the word expenditures is
used in both Sections 90 and 93 of the Restatement of the
Law of Restitution.
Thus, in St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v.
Crosetti Bros., Inc., 475 P.2d 69 (Ore., 1970), the Oregon
Supreme Court ruled:
"The rule in most jurisdictions, regardless
of whether indemnity is based upon an implied
or an express agreement, is that when a claim
is made against an indemnitee for which he is
entitled to indemnification, the indemnitor is
liable for any reasonable expenses incurred by
the indemnitee in defending against such claim,
regardless of whether the indemnitee is
ultimately held not liable. Paliaga v. Luckenback Steamship Co., 301 F.2d 403, 408 (2d Cir.
1962); Miller and Company of Birmingham v.
Louisville & N. R. Co., 328 F.2d 73, 78 (5th
Cir., 1964); Southern Arizona York Refrigeration
Co. v. Bush Mfg. Co., 331 F.2d 1, 60 (9th Cir.,
1964); O'Connell v. Jackson, 273 Minn. 91, 140
N.W.2d 65, 69 (1966); Commercial Standard Ins.
Co. v. Cleveland, 86 Ariz. 288, 345 P.2d 210,
216 (1959); Restatement, Restitution § 80,
Comment b., 356. We so hold. Statements in
New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Terrall, 165 Or. 390,
107 P.2d 843 (1940), and National Surety Co. v.
Johnson, 115 Or. 624, 239 P. 538 (1925) are not
to be construed to the contrary."
Idaho adopted the rationale and authority of the
Oregon Court in Farber v. State, 682 P.2d 630 (Idaho, 1984).
Indemnification has been recognized in common law
and in the case of Southern Arizona York Refrigeration v.
Bush Mfg. Co., 331 F.2d 1 (9th Cir., 1964), the federal
court held that only that if the indemnitee establishes its
right to indemnity is it entitled to recover its costs
including attorney's fees incurred in defending the action.
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The Restatement of Torts 2d § 914 (2) states:
"(2) One who through the tort of another
has been required to act in trie protection
of his interests by bringing qr defending
an action against a third per ^on is entitled
to recover reasonable compensajt ion for loss
of time, attorney fees and othe r expenditures
thereby suffered or incurred i|n the earlier
action."
For further discussion and ca 3es holding the award
of attorneys fees is proper, see United States Fire Ins.
Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 505 P.2d

137 (Oregon, 1973).

This case summarizes common law indemnify as summarized by
Restatement of the Law of Restitution § 76.
The Washington Court of Appea s aptly summarized
the law in Wagner v. Beech Aircraft Cor^> . , 680 P.2d 425
(Wash. App., 1984), and stated:
"In Aldrich & Hedman, Inc., vJ Blakely,
31 Wash. App. 16, 639 P.2d 23 (1982), the
Court of Appeals reviewed the law in this
state with respect to the riglit of a litigant
to recover attorney's fees anq other defense
costs. The Court summarized the law as
follows:
"Attorney's fees are generally not recoverable in the absence of contract, statute,
or a recognized ground of equity. Where
the natural and proximate consequence of
the acts or omissions of a party to an
agreement or an event have exposed one to
litigation with a third person, equity
may allow attorney's fees as an element of
consequential damages. Three elements are
necessary to create this equitable right to
recover attorney's fees: (1) a wrongful act
or omission by A towards B; (2 ) such act or
omission exposes or involves Ip in litigation
with C; and (3) C was not connected with the
original wrongful act or omis? ion of A
towards B."
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Wyoming adheres to the award of attorney's fees in
an indemnification situation and has done so for many years.
Miller v., New York Oil Co. (supra) .
Alaska in D. G. Shelter Products v. Moduline
Industries (supra), in approving the award of attorney's
fees in the footnote to the decision, observed:
"5. The 'general rule' was stated in Heritage
v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d
1059, 1967 (Alaska 1979), quoting Addy v.
Bolton, 257 S.C. 28, 183 S.E.2d 708, 710
(1971):
[I]n actions of indemnity, brought where
the duty to indemnify is either implied by
law or arises under contract, and no personal
fault of the indemnitee has joined in causing
the injury, reasonable attorney's fees incurred
in resisting the claim indemnified against may
be recovered as part of the damages and
expenses. (Emphasis added)
"We note what appears to be a technical error
in our published opinion in Heritage. The
italicized language in the above paragraph
does not appear in Addy v. Bolton, which
Heritage purports to quote. Heritage,
nevertheless, accurately states the
general rule."
In the case of Vallegos v. C. E. Glass Company,
583 F.2d 507 (10th Cir., 1978), the Circuit Court of Appeals
observed:
"It is true that in connection with indemnity
claims recovery may generally be had for
attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in
defense against the principal claim, but not
for those incurred in establishing the right
of indemnity."
(Citing extensive authority)
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Trans-West has not asserted a claim tor |any costs or attorney's
fees with respect to the matters arising since the settlement
of the claims of the plaintiffs.
In a case based on the passiv^ negligence of a
seller of an automobile as opposed to the active negligence
of the manufacturer, Ford Motor Company J the Florida Court
in Insurance Company of North America v. King, 340 So.2d
1175 (Fla. App., 1976), ruled:
"In these circumstances, we hc|ld that
Fort Lauderdale Lincoln-Mercuijy, Inc., as
indemnitee is entitled to recover from
Ford Motor Company, as part of its damages
reasonable attorneyfs fees and reasonable
and proper legal costs and expenses. . . . "
In a later case, where the indemnitee was successful in
defending itself against the claims of the plaintiff and,
therefore, did not have to pay any judgment, the Florida
court reversed the trial court which denied the imposition
of attorney's fees that the indemnitee riaid out in the
defense.

In this case, Pender v. Skillqraft Industries, Inc.,

358 So.2d 45 (Fla. App., 1978), the cou^t point out
"We therefore reverse the lowq r court's
denial of the cross-claim for indemnification and hold that if a retailer would
clearly have been entitled to indemnification of attorney's fees and court costs
if it had lost in the main actjion and had
a judgment rendered against it] (for passive
negligence, breach of implied
strict liability), then it will be equally
entitled to such indemnification in the
event that it should successfully defend
itself in the main action."
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This is precisely the position taken by Cessna,
that as Trans-West was not compelled to pay anything on the
settlement, that it is not entitled to any indemnification
of its costs of defense.

Such is not the law as pointed out

in Pender,
Many of the other cases cited in this brief have
authorized the award of attorney's fees to the indemnitee,
such as Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 402 F. Supp 738 (Mo.,
1975).

In Whittle v. Timesavers, Inc., 572 F. Supp 584

(Va., 1983), the imposition of attorney's fees was predicated
upon an implied contract and, thus, authorized under the
theory of the existence of a contract.
See also Alterman Foods, Inc., v. G.C.C. Beverages,
Inc. , 310 S.E.2d 755 (Ga., 1983).
It is submitted that the claim of Cessna to the
effect that Trans-West did not extricate itself from the
lawsuit in a timely manner is totally without merit.

A

reading of the complaint, objectively, shows that the allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint were only indirectly
aimed at Trans-West.
The basic claims were that the aircraft was not
constructed properly nor were the components fit for the
purposes for which they were made and sold.

Trans-West, as

the seller, under the generally recognized principles of
products liability law, was properly in the lawsuit, but
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only as a passive party.

The law of indemnification in

these types of suits is clear and almost without exception,
that Trans-West was entitled to indemnification and that it
is entitled to recoup its out-of-pocket costs and expenses
and costs of defense including reasonable attorney's fees.
In the case of Herman v. General Irrigation Co.,
247 N.W.2d 472 (N.D., 1976), the North Dakota court held:
"It is the general rule that a retailer
or other seller suffering and paying a
judgment against him by an injured person
in a warranty action is entitled to
indemnity from a manufacturer who
sold the product to him with a similar
warranty. 3 Frumer & Friedman Products
Liability § 44.03[1]. And in the field
of products liability, the concept underlying allowance of indemnity is that the
indemnitee has been rendered ljiable because
of a nondelegable duty arising out of
common or statutory law, but the actual
cause of the injury has been t^he act of
another person. 3 Frumer & Friedman,
supra, § 44.02 [2]. See Burbage v. Boiler
Engineering and Supply Co., 433 Pa. 319,
249 A.2d 563 (1969)
As pointed out in other cases, whether a judgment
is rendered or not, the costs of defense are recoverable
under indemnification.
To hold otherwise would be to in effect say to the
seller, "let the plaintiff get a judgment as we will be
repaid by the manufacturer and let's not worry about a
defense to what may be a case without merit."
In the case now before the Court, Trans-West did
nothing wrong, other than to sell a bad aircraft which it
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did not make, design, manufacture, equip or assemble, and,
thus, it defended its position of no liability to the plaintiffs.
Had it paid $10,000 or $20,000 in settlement, would Cessna
now admit that it was liable to Trans-West for the settlement
sums paid?

The writer does not believe that the Supreme

Court is that naive as to believe that Cessna would admit
that it would be liable for any such payments.

But is there

a difference between monies expended in defending against a
claim and paying that claim, when it comes to indemnification?
The answer is no.
Trans-West is entitled to be made whole in this
matter and that includes the payment of its costs of defense
which include reasonable attorney's fees.
Cessna asserts that it was never adjudicated as
being liable to the plaintiff in this case nor was the
aircraft determined to have been faulty or negligently
constructed, therefore, Trans-West has no cause of action.
In short, it is asserting the hypothesis that
before Trans-West is entitled to indemnification there must
have been a complete adjudication of the case on its merits.
It is respectfully submitted, that while many of
the cases cited herein did in fact arise after the adjudication
or liability of the manufacturer, still the damages suffered
by the retailer, Trans-West, were complete and actual by
merely defending the action brought against it and the
manufacturer.
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It is submitted that the law is or should be in
i

Utah that all damages incurred by the retailer not through
its fault or active negligent conduct are compensable from
the manufacturer.
To compel the retailer to refuse to settle any
case or actively attempt to block the settlement of the
primary parties to litigation under the theory that to do
otherwise would constitute a waiver of Its rights of indemnification, is to not only invite continued litigation but to
emasculate the settlement process which1is one of the foundations
of the legal profession.
If this is the law, then the law needs to be
changed.

If the law is unclear, then tpe Supreme Court

should define what the law is in this regard so that future
innocent retailers will know that once a product liability
suit is filed, it must be tried to the ultimate and final
conclusion, regardless of the wishes of|the plaintiff or the
!
I

manufacturer-defendant, and regardless of the merits of the
case or that a good faith settlement may be made without the
loss of rights to be made whole by the ijianufacturer.
would have the Court reach this conclusion.

Cessna

Cessna asserts

that this is the law.
Cessna further asserts that the settlement documents
that it was instrumental in preparing specifically state
that there is no admission of liability!or of negligence on
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the part of Cessna.

Trans-West admits this.

Any settlement

document which is prepared by competent counsel would have
such an exculpatory clause in it.

However, it is submitted

that such a clause does not repair the injury to the retailerseller's pocketbook.

It still had to defend itself against

the slings and arrows of the plaintiff, and in raising its
shield to do so, it defended the very product which it had
no part of creating, designing, making or equipping, to the
benefit of the manufacturer.
POINT SIX
THE LAW OF INDEMNIFICATION DOES NOT REQUIRE
THAT THE CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES BE FULLY
ADJUDICATED BEFORE THE PASSIVE DEFENDANT MAY
MAINTAIN HIS ACTION FOR INDEMNIFICATION.
The law is clear that a claim of indemnification
will lie by way of cross-claim or third-party complaint
whenever an action is commenced whereby a named party defendant
has the right of claim against another defendant or another
party.
Rule 13 (f) and Rule 14 (a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, authorize and sanction this procedure.
In Stanley Title Company v. Continental Bank and
Trust Company, 26 U.2d 121, 485 P.2d 1400 (1971), the Utah
Supreme Court observed:
"Under Rule 13 (f), U.R.C.P., it is no
longer necessary that the liability sued
upon in the cross claim must first have
become fixed by a judgment as at common
law."
(Citing authority)
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The Utah Supreme Court reversed a dismissal of a
cross-claim for indemnification in the case of Sanone v.
J. C. Penney Company, 404 P.2d 248 (Utah, 1965).
Thus, Cessna's contention that Trans-West cannot
maintain its cross-claim against Cessna for indemnification
is without merit.
POINT SEVEN
CESSNA KNEW THAT UPON READING THE COMPLAINT
THAT TRANS-WEST WAS A PASSIVE SELLER AND THAT
IT KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT IT HAD THE
DUTY TO DEFEND THE ACTION.
It is obvious from the reading of the complaint of
the plaintiffs in this matter that the responsibility of
Trans-West was that of a passive seller of a product which
had been manufactured by the defendant Cessna.
All of the allegations, while mentioning TransWest, run to the manufacture, design, and equipping of the
P-210 aircraft and to the method of financing carried on
exclusively by Cessna or Cessna Finance Company, the wholly
owned subsidiary of Cessna.
There is no one single allegation of the complaint
that runs to alleged conduct of Trans-W^st which was not
tied in as a seller of the product manufactured, designed
and equipped by Cessna or which ran to the financing of the
aircraft by Cessna Finance.
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The contention of Cessna that the complaint spelled
out culpable negligence or misrepresentation on the part of
Trans-West is just not spelled out in the complaint.
As stated in Insurance Company of North America
v. King, 340 So.2d 1175 (Fla. App., 1976):
"A plaintiff should not be able to arbitrarily
deprive a defendant of his right to indemnification from a third party by alleging that he
was actively negligent when in fact that defendant
is found not to have been actively negligent."
Wording this another way is to say that Cessna
cannot take the unproven accusations of the plaintiffs1
complaint and assert that as the plaintiffs asserted the
active participation of Trans-West in either the breach of
warranties or negligence, whichever theory the plaintiffs
were proceeding on, and use this as a means of ducking out
of an indemnification liability.
From the very wording of the complaint and a
knowledge that Trans-West did not modify or alter the aircraft
and in fact did not even have the physical facilities to do
so, the defense of Cessna that Trans-West did not work the
case into a posture of where Cessna should have taken over
the defense is without merit and should be summarily dismissed.
POINT EIGHT
THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS OF THIS CASE
ESTABLISH THAT TRANS-WEST WAS A PASSIVE
PARTY.
Cessna asserts that Trans-West is not entitled to
indemnification because there was no court adjudication that
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Trans-West was liable to and compelled to pay damages to the
plaintiff.
Cessna did not dispute any of the uncontroverted
facts asserted by Trans-West which factually establish it as
a passive party or a passive tortfeasor^
Cessna asserts that there had to be an adjudication
that the aircraft was faulty before indemnification arose.
It is submitted that this is not the law, or if it
is the law in some jurisdictions, it should not be the law
in Utah.
It is submitted that the better law is that where,
if the status of being passive as opposed to active, is
shown by the uncontroverted facts, whether or not ultimate
liability is established is immaterial ^s to the passive
party, as it is still obligated to defend and still incurs
costs, expenses, and damages, including its attorney's fees,
not through what it did, other than fall into the unhappy
role of the ultimate retailer (seller), but by virtue of its
status, while the manufacturer, whether or not it extricates
itself from the charges, who caused the problem in the first
place says, try the case, otherwise no indemnification.
Trans-West was ready to pick up the gauntlet as to
the issues of there having been a faulty aircraft produced
by Cessna and as to the passive position of itself, but was
precluded from doing so by the trial court not permitting it
to go forward and prove those things at the scheduled trial
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that Cessna now claims were necessary before indemnification
could be invoked.
Cessna espouses case after case which indicate
that a full adjudication of the question of liability of the
party seeking indemnification must be determined, but then
asserts that it was entitled to summary judgment on the
question of indemnification because the trial date was a few
days after the date for the hearing of the motions for
summary judgment.
If Cessna is right, then it is patently error for
the trial court to strike the trial date and preclude that
issue which Cessna claims is dispositive of Trans-West's
right to indemnification.
This is a matter of seeking to have one's cake and
eat it too.
POINT NINE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING
A TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF THE DEFECTIVE
AIRCRAFT.
Cessna asserts that there was no showing that the
aircraft in question was defective, thus, there was no
responsibility for Cessna to indemnify Trans-West.
Further, there was no court adjudication that
Trans-West was a passive party as opposed to an active
tortfeasor.
These issues were set down for trial by the trial
court, but then both parties filed motions for summary
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judgment and the court struck the trial date and upon ruling
in favor of Cessna dismissed Trans-West s cause of action,
thusf the issue of the defectiveness of the aircraft in
question has not been adjudicated, nor ^n adjudication of
the status of Trans-West, although the ifincontested facts
clearly demonstrate that Trans-West was at best a passive
negligent party.
If the Supreme Court determines that the law is
that there must be an adjudication of the existence of a
faulty product before indemnification of a seller will lie,
then the trial court erred in not allowing a trial on this
issue and that matter should be remandecfi back to the trial
court for a determination of this issuei
Utah law is clear that where there is a material
genuine issue of fact undecided, summary judgment will not
lie,

Cowen & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109

(Utah, 1984); Hobelman Motors, Inc., v. Allred, 685 P.2d 544
(Utah, 1984)
The trial court could not clo^e its eyes to the
issues of the ultimate liability of Trans-West under the
facts of the plaintiff's case, if that ikltimate liability
was in fact and law necessary to decide the case.
If the Supreme Court decides ^hat those ultimate
facts had to be decided, then clearly, ^rans-West is entitled
to its day in Court to prove those elements which are required
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to invoke indemnification.

Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041

(Utah, 1984); McBride v. Jones, 615 P.2d 431 (Utah, 1980).
It has not been afforded this constitutional and statutory
right in this matter, and, thus, the trial court's summary
judgment must be reversed and the matter remanded back for
trial on the issues.
This would be a material genuine issue of fact
which would preclude summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff
in this matter and which was clearly before the Court.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that under the equitable
principles as recognized by the State of Utah, either by the
adoption of common law or by the better case law adopted
throughout the United States, which Utah should adopt, that
where a retail seller is beset with having to defend a
manufacturer for a manufacturer defect in a product, the
seller is entitled to recoup its losses for defending the
action, which it is a party to by reason of its being a
passive, tortfeasor, or by being a party to an implied contract
of indemnity.
It is further respectfully submitted that the
better law throughout the United States would afford relief
to Trans-West in this matter for its attorney's fees and
costs as a part of the damages suffered by Trans-West that
it was compelled to obligate itself in defending against the
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claims of plaintiffs, who were seeking, and did in fact
assert and compel a substantial settlement from the manufacturer,
thus, showing that the airplane was indeed faulty and subject
to the claims of the plaintiffs for design and manufacturing
defect.
It is respectfully submitted that the damages
which include attorney's fees sought in this matter should
be granted and that Trans-West Aircraft Sales, Inc.'s motion
for summary judgment should have been granted as against
Cessna Aircraft Company.
It is respectfully submitted that in the alternative
this matter should be remanded back to the Trial Court for a
trial on the issues of the status of Trans-West being a
passive party and the question of the alleged defective
product being sold to the plaintiff thereby raising the
right of indemnification.
Re speerE"fi)lly submitted,

Attorney for Defendant, Appellant
Trans-West Aircraft Sales, Inc.
Suite 280, 311 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

U

-

2 O

n

HANOVER LIMITED, a partnership;
WESTERN MAINTENANCE AND
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah corporation; and BROOKE GRANT,.an
individual,
Plaintiffs,
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JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
OF CROSS-CLAIM
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-vs.CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, a
Kansas corporation; CESSNA
FINANCE CORPORATION, a Kansas corporation; TELEDYNE INDUSTRIES,
INC., a California corporation;
AAR NORTHWEST, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and TRANS WEST
AIRCRAFT SALES, INC., a Utah
corporation,

Civil No. C 82-4799
(Judge David B. Dee)

Defendants.

The reciprocal motions for summary judgment of crossclaimant Trans West Aircraft Sales, Inc. and cross-defendants
Cessna Aircraft Company and Cessna Finance Corporation came
on regularly for hearing before the Honorable David B. Dee on

•39-

Thursday, December 5, 1985 with Paul N. Cotro-Manes representing
the cross-claimant, H. Wayne Wadsworth representing cross-defendant Cessna Aircraft Company and Robert L. Stevens representing
cross-defendant Cessna Finance Corporation.
After argument of counsel, the Court took the matter
under advisement and now being fully advised in the premises
and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

The motions for summary judgment of Cessna Aircraft

Company and Cessna Finance Corporation be, and the same hereby
are, granted and judgment is entered in favor of said cross-defen
dants dismissing the cross-claim of Trans West Aircraft Sales,
Inc. with prejudice and upon the merits; and
2.

The motion for summary judgment of cross-claimant

Trans West Aircraft Sales, Inc. be, atid the same hereby is,
denied.
DATED this

day of December, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

DAVID B. DEE
DISTRICT JUDGE
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13 (f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(f) Cross-Claim Against Co-Party. A pleading may state as a crossclaim any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original
action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is
the subject matter of the original action. Such cross-claim may include
a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to
the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against
the cross-claimant.

RULE 14 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE
(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At any time after
commencement of the action a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may
cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to
the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against him. The third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make
the service if he files the third-party complaint not later than ten days after
he serves his original answer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion
upon notice to all parties to the action. The person served with the summons and third-party complaint, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall make his defenses to the third-party plaintiff's claim as provided
in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff and crossclaims against other third-party defendants as provided in Rule 13. The
third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff any defenses which
the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim. The third-party defendant may also assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim
against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against
the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses as
provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and cross-claims as provided in
Rule 13. A third-party defendant may proceed under this rule against any
person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or
part of the claim made in the action against the third-party defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * *

HANOVER LIMITED, a partnership;
WESTERN MAINTENANCE AND
MANAGEMENT, INC., A Utah
corporation; and BROOKE GRANT,
an individual,
C i v i l No. C 82-4799

Plaintiffs,
-vs-

(Deposition of:

CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, a
Kansas corporation; CESSNA
FINANCE COMPANY, A Kansas
corporation; TELEDYNE INDUSTRIES
INC., a California corporation;
AAR NORTHWEST, INC., a Delaware
corporation; AND TRANS WEST
AIRCRAFT SALES, INC., a Utah
corporation,

BROOKE GRANT

Defendants.
* * *

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 7th1day of December, 1982,
the deposition of BROOKE GRANT, produced as a witness herein
at the instance of the defendant herein, in the above-entitlec|
action now pending in the above-named!court, was taken before
VIKI HATTON, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public
in and for the State of Utah, commenc|ing at the hour of 9:30
a.m. of said day at the offices of WAlrKISS & CAMPBELL, 310
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utpih.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to notice.

eefiive
VIKI E. HATTON

#9 Exchange Place Suite 814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

LICENSE #91
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801-363-1458

way I got to him,
Q

He hadn't called you back, had he, to find out whether or

not you were still interested in the aircraft?
A

I may have some phone messages to verify that or not, but

that would be hard for me to tell at this stage.
Q

Anyway, when you went in to see Mr. Battochio, you'd

already made up your mind, had you not, to buy a Cessna P-210?
A

That's —

I try and never make up my mind on buying

anything until I make sure I can cut the kind of deal I want.
My business consists of negotiating with situations and
people, so I try —

if your mind is made up, you're not going

to be able to get a good buy.
Q

So when you walked in to see Mr. Battochio, it wasn't the

performance of the airplane, or the type of airplane, it was
how much you were going to pay for the aircraft that made the
determination as to whether you were going to buy or not; is
that true?
A

I'd like it to be that open or shut but I don't

believe it was.

We talked a great deal about the airplane,

about what they could do.
Q

What did he tell you that you didn't already know about

it?
A

That's —

let see, as I can remember, we talked about the

economics of owning it, talked about the capability it had, I
think I talked with him about the aspect of putting a

85
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Robertson stole on it, whether or not that would add to the
safety of it, something I ultimately dl;(id not do*
Q

With respect to the capabilities, did he tell you

anything about that aircraft, what it Icould do or didn't do
that you already didn't know?
A

That's hard for me to say.

I wad amassing so much,

trying to amass so much information about it.

He gave me some

of the advertising brochures that detailed a fair amount about
the airplane.

I think I've got at least one of them that's

still got the Trans West name on it, ^o, you know, as to
reliance and whether I was —

I don't, think I was selling him

on the airplane, I think he was selling me on it.
Q

Over and above the information contained in that brochure
V

or those brochures, did he tell you anything additional that
was in those brochures about the performance of the aircraft?
A

I don't think so.

You mean did he make any

recommendations outside of what Cessnlc|a was representing?
don't remember.
Q

I

I don't remember thait he did.

Would that be true not only of the performance but as to

the economics of owning that aircraft?
A

No. We had some conversations ruegarding how fast it

would depreciate and what would happen on the curves of —
210's tended to be a very good airplane to own, they and
Beechcrafts were the best single engine, so we had some
discussions on that that I don't thirjik Cessna was representing

86
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in their material.
Q

Of course, you knew as a businessman and as a banker that

the economics of owning an aircraft and the resale value of an
airplane are highly dependent upon the economical situation in
the country, are they not?
A

Well, I'm not one of thw world's experts on owning

aircraft, as maybe this case demonstrates.

I, you know, I'm

aware that most things have to do with the economic nature of
the country, but this was the first really major investment I
had made in aircraft.
minuscule.

Before this, the dollar amounts were

So, you know, I did rely to some extent on the

experts and I considered Gene one of them.
Q

And you relied upon what he had told you the economics of

the situation was with respect to this aircraft?
A

I think that's probably a fair statement.

Q

Would you please tell me now specifically what you relied

upon what he told you?
A

I think that we discussed whether purchasing the plane at

the price we were talking about, approximately $132,000, would
be a good economic decision, whether in buying something
$32,500 less than its list would enable me to own the plane
for, I think I put two years as a number on it, without
suffering very much in the way of depreciation.
Q

At the end of that two year period of time, you didn't

sell this aircraft, did you?

87
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